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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Sudan

Assessment of Numayri Regime

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President Numayri, after almost six years in power, is continuing to have problems broadening his regime's base of support, but he is likely to remain on top if only because of the absence of a viable alternative. Faced with domestic challenges, Numayri, must continue to pay close attention to internal security while pushing economic development.

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Sensing that any threat to his regime will probably be precipitated by economic discontent, Numayri has sought to buy time against the day when the results of current development projects should begin to pay off. He has embarked on a major public relations campaign to demonstrate his personal commitment to economic progress and has sought to take the steam out of domestic criticism of the country's economic problems by giving civil servants an across-the-board pay raise.

Numayri has sought to head off discontent in the army, where any plots to overthrow him would most likely originate. He assumed the defense portfolio last November amid publicity given to the earlier discovery of an alleged plot by several noncommissioned officers. University students, in the past the source of considerable anti-regime agitation, have been quiet for months, suggesting they may have learned that off-campus demonstrations will not be tolerated. Consequently, power groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood students have advised their followers to restrict activities to the campus. Labor unions—often an unsettling element in Sudanese politics—appear to be under control.

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Most Sudanese politicians who might provide a challenge to Numayri have been neutralized by long periods of exile. Former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, whose political power is based on his role as leader of the important Ansar sect, sees himself as a rallying point, but he has lost influence in Sudan as a result of the government's buildup of domestic rivals. The banning of all political parties except the government-controlled Sudanese Socialist Union will also make it difficult for anti-Numayri civilians to gain power except in the wake of a military coup. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

25X1A

Tanzania

Shaping the Elite

President Julius Nyerere is continuing to press forward with his egalitarian and socialist goals for Tanzania by increasing the ruling party's role in selecting candidates for higher education and by extending the ban on private business interests for members of the party. The measures are consistent with other government policies, such as grouping the rural population into socialist villages.

The Executive Committee of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which reflects the thinking of Nyerere and his top associates, decided in late November that admission to higher education is to be restricted to persons who have two years' work experience and the recommendation of their local TANU branch. A university spokesman announced in late December that the abolition of direct university matriculation will take effect immediately.

The requirement that applicants for the university will need the blessing of a TANU chapter will serve to reward young activists and ideologues and further inhibit criticism of the party and its programs, both by prospective students and their families. It is also anticipated that local TANU branches will discriminate against children of Tanzania's prosperous 30,000-member Asian minority which makes up much of the country's remaining middle class and which includes technicians and professionals.

The TANU executive committee also decided that a prohibition on private business activity is to be extended to all party members. The measure has applied since 1967 to candidates for public office and to officials of the government and the ubiquitous semi-public corporations. This prohibition—called the Leadership Code—forbids holding a second paid job, serving on a corporation board of directors, and owning stock certificates or rental housing.

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The Leadership Code has generally been observed and enforced, but its extension to all TANU members is likely to meet some resistance. An editorial in the government-owned Daily News suggested that flexibility would be needed in the application of the code to the entire TANU membership. Without mentioning Asians or Africans, the editorial implied that the Asians, as "persons committed to exploiting others" should be more sternly dealt with than Africans. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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India

PLO Given Permission to Open Office in New Delhi

India's decision to permit the Palestine Liberation Organization to open an office in New Delhi follows months of strong lobbying from the Arabs.

When the Arabs exempted India from the oil embargo after the 1973 Middle East war, they made clear they expected India to go beyond its traditional limited political support for Arab causes. They requested both the closing of the Israeli consulate in Bombay, Israel's sole representation in India, and the opening of the PLO office in the Indian capital. In its announcement on January 10 that the PLO office would be opened, New Delhi reaffirmed its recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians, but noted that this step did not constitute diplomatic relations.

India wants to maintain close and cordial ties with the Arabs, both because of dependence on oil imports and a desire to prevent Pakistan from lining up diplomatic support against India from fellow Muslim states. The gesture toward the PLO should enhance India's bid for concessions on oil prices, and creates a favorable atmosphere for Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Iraq from January 18 to 21. New Delhi has taken no steps, however, to close the Israeli consulate in Bombay. India believes it inconsistent with its status as a major regional power to accede fully to Arab demands. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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